Abstract: Biosemiotics asserts the idea that semiosis is fundamental to life, and that all living creatures are therefore semiotic systems. The idea itself is strongly supported by the evidence of the genetic code -but thus far it has made little impact in the scientific world, and is largely regarded as the basis for a philosophy of meaning, rather than a basis for a science of meaning. This is regrettable, but perhaps understandable from the scientists' point of view. Scientists know that the cell is the necessary unit of all life. I will argue here, then, that Biosemiotics can become a science only if it can prove that the cell is, in fact, a semiotic system -i.e., that semiosis exists at the cellular level. To do this, we first need to define what is semiosis, so that we can be explicit about what exactly constitutes a semiotic system. So far, we have had two main answers to this question. One is the model proposed by Saussure, who defined a semiotic system as a duality of ' signifier and signified' . The other is the model of Peirce, who pointed out that interpretation is an essential component of semiosis and defined a semiotic system as a triad of ' sign, object and interpretant' . After the discovery of the genetic code, each of these two models have been applied to biology and have given rise to two distinct schools of biosemiotics. One is the school of Marcel Florkin (1974) , which is based on the model of Saussure, and the other is the school of Thomas Sebeok (1972 Sebeok ( , 2001 , which is based on the model of Peirce. Unfortunately, neither of them can be applied to the cell, and that is why most biologists continue to be skeptical about biosemiotics. There is however a third model of semiosis that is actually applicable to the cell. It is based on the theory that the cell is a trinity of genotype, phenotype and ribotype (Barbieri 1981 (Barbieri , 1985(Barbieri , 2003. Here, the ribotype is the ribonucleoprotein system of the cell and represents its ' codemaker' , i.e., the seat of the genetic code. This model assumes that semiosis is defined by coding, not by interpretation, and is therefore referred to as the code model of semiosis. This paper is dedicated to illustrating this third model and, above all, to showing that the cell is a true semiotic system.
Introduction
A t the heart of biosemiotics is the idea that all living creatures are semiotic systems -but thus far, this idea has made little impact in the scientifi c world, and is largely regarded as a philosophical view rather than a ground for science. Th ere are many reasons for this, but the most important, in my opinion, is the fact that biosemiotics has not yet proven that the cell is a semiotic system. Th e cell is the necessary unit of all of life, and there is no chance that biosemiotics can become a science if it does not prove that signs exist in the cell at the molecular level. Th is is the fi rst and the most important challenge of biosemiotics: can it prove that the cell is a semiotic system?
In this enterprise, the starting point must be a defi nition of semiosis -and to this purpose, it is natural to turn to the classical models of Saussure and Peirce, especially as modifi ed by their biosemiotic followers. Th e diff erence between these two models is often described by saying that Saussure proposed a dualistic model of the sign (made up of signifi er-signifi ed), whereas Peirce proposed a triadic model (made up of sign-object-interpretant). Yet in reality, even the model of Saussure is a triadic one, because the link between signifi ers and signifi ed is provided by the rules of a cultural code, i.e., by the rules of language. Th ese rules come from a community and therefore from outside the individual systems -whereas the process of interpretation is necessarily produced within the individual system.
In short, according to Saussure, a semiotic system consists of signifi ers, signifi ed and conventions, where the conventions of a code come from a codemaker which is outside the system. According to Peirce, a semiotic system consists of signs, objects and interpretants, where the interpretants come from an interpreter which is inside the system and takes an active part in semiosis. Th e real diff erence between Saussure and Peirce, therefore, is not between a dyadic and a triadic model of semiosis. It is between a model based on coding and a model based on interpretation. More precisely, between a model based on external coding and a model based on internal interpretation.
Th ese two models have been applied in biology, and have given rise to two distinct schools of biosemiotics. One is the school of Marcel Florkin (1974) , which is based on the model of Saussure, and the other is the school of Th omas Sebeok (1972 Sebeok ( , 2001 , which is based on the model of Peirce. Unfortunately, none of these models turns out to provide a good description of the cell because they can account only for some of its characteristics. Th e cell contains a genetic code, and in this respect it is like a Saussurean system because it has a codemaker, not an interpreter. Th e cellular codemaker, on the other hand, is inside the system, not outside it, and in that respect the cell is like a Peircean system. Th is suggests that a realistic model of the cell belongs to yet a third category. A semiotic system is always made of signs and meanings that are linked together by the components of a third party, but this party can be of three diff erent types: (1) an external codemaker, (2) an internal interpreter and (3) an internal codemaker. We have therefore three distinct models of semiosis, and here it is shown that the third model does allow us to prove that the cell is a semiotic system.
The Code Model of Semiosis
Semiotics is usually referred to as the study of signs (from the Greek semeion = sign) but I want to propose that this defi nition is too restrictive, because signs are always associated with other entities. A sign, to start with, is always linked to a meaning. As living beings, we have a built-in drive to make sense of the world, to give meanings to things, and when we give a meaning to something, that something becomes a sign for us. Sign and meaning, in other words, cannot be taken apart, because they are the two sides of the same coin. Semiotics, therefore, is not just the study of signs; it is the study of signs and meanings together. Th e result is that a system of signs, i.e., a semiotic system, is always made of at least two distinct worlds: a world of entities that we call signs and a world of entities that represent their meanings.
Th e link between sign and meaning, in turn, calls attention to a third entity, i.e., to their relationship. A sign is a sign only when it stands for something that is other than itself, and this otherness implies at least some degree of independence. It means that there is no deterministic relationship between sign and meaning. Diff erent languages, for example, give diff erent names to the same object, precisely because there is no necessary connection between names and objects. A semiotic system, therefore, is not just any combination of two distinct worlds. It is a combination of two worlds between which there is no necessary link, and this realization has extraordinary consequences. It implies that a bridge between the two worlds can be established only by conventional rules, i.e., by the rules of a code. Th is is what defi nes the semiotic systems, and what makes them diff erent from everything else: a semiotic system is a system made of two independent worlds that are connected by the conventional rules of a code. A semiotic system, in conclusion, is necessarily made of three distinct entities: signs, meanings and code.
Here at last we have a defi nition where it is stated explicitly that a code is an essential component of a semiotic system. It is the rules of a code that create a correspondence between signs and meanings, and we can say therefore that an act of semiosis is always an act of coding, i.e., it is always a convention. More precisely, we can say that an elementary act of semiosis is a triad of 'sign, meaning and convention' , whereas a semiotic system is the whole set of signs and meanings that are linked together by all the various conventions that make up a code.
Signs, meanings and conventions, however, do not come into existence of their own. Th ere is always an ' agent' that produces them, and that agent can be referred to as a codemaker because it is always an act of coding that gives origin to semiosis. In the case of culture, for example, the codemaker is the human mind, since it is the mind that produces the mental objects that we call signs and meanings and the conventions that link them together. We come in this way to a general conclusion that can be referred to as 'the code model of semiosis': a semiotic system is a triad of signs, meanings and code that are all produced by the same agent, i.e., by the same codemaker.
Th is conclusion is highly relevant to biology because it tells us precisely what we need to prove in order to show that the cell is a semiotic system. We need to prove that in every living cell there are four distinct entities: signs, meanings, code and codemaker.
The Cell as a Trinity
Th e idea that life is based on genes and proteins is often expressed by saying that every living system is a duality of genotype and phenotype. Th is model was fi rst proposed by Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909, but came to prominence only in the 1940s and 1950s, when molecular biology discovered that genes are chemically diff erent from proteins -and, above all, when it became clear that genes carry linear information whereas proteins function by virtue of their three-dimensional structures. Th e genotype-phenotype duality is therefore a dichotomy that divides not only two diff erent biological functions (heredity and metabolism), but also two diff erent physical quantities (information and energy). It is the simplest and most general way of defi ning a living system, and has become the foundational paradigm of modern biology, the scheme that transformed the energy-based biology of the nineteeth century into the information-based biology of the twentieth century.
In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the study of protein synthesis revealed that genes and proteins are not formed spontaneously in the cell, but are manufactured by a system of molecular machines based on RNAs. In 1981, the components of this manufacturing system were called ribosoids, and the system itself was given the collective name of ribotype (Barbieri 1981 (Barbieri , 1985 . Th e cell was described in this way as a structure made of genes, proteins and ribosoids, i.e., as a trinity of genotype, phenotype and ribotype.
Th is model is based on the conclusion that the ribotype had historical priority over the genotype and the phenotype. In the model, spontaneous genes and spontaneous proteins did appear on the primitive Earth -but these proto-structures could not give origin to cells because they did not have biological specifi city. Rather, they gave origin to copymakers and codemakers, respectively, and it was these molecular machines, made of ribosoids, that evolved into the fi rst cells.
Th e RNAs and the proteins that appeared spontaneously on the primitive Earth produced a wide variety of ribosoids, some of which were synthetizing ribosoids whereas others were ribogenes and others were riboproteins (or ribozymes). Th e systems produced by the combination of all these molecules, therefore, had a ribotype, a ribogenotype and a ribophenotype. Eventually, evolution replaced the ribogenes with genes and the riboproteins with proteins but the synthetising ribosoids of the ribotype have never been replaced. Th is shows not only that the ribotype is a distinct category of the cell, but also that it is a category without which the cell simply cannot exist.
Th e ribosoids of the ribotype are the oldest phylogenetic molecules that exist on Earth (Woese 2000) and they fi rmly remain at the heart of every living cell. Genes, proteins and ribosoids are all manufactured molecules, but only the ribosoids themselves become makers of such molecules. Th is concept can perhaps be illustrated by comparing the cell to a city where proteins are the material objects, genes are the instructions and ribosoids are the 'makers' of genes and proteins, i.e., the inhabitants of the city.
It is an experimental fact, at any rate, that every cell contains a system of RNAs and ribonucleoproteins that makes proteins according to the rules of a code. Th at system can therefore be described as a ' code-and-template-dependentprotein-maker' , i.e., as a ' codemaker' . Th is ' codemaker' is the third party that makes of every living cell a trinity of genotype, phenotype and ribotype. Th e genotype is the seat of heredity, the phenotype is the seat of metabolism, and the ribotype is the codemaker of the cell -the seat of the genetic code.
The Defining Feature of Signs and Meanings
A semiotic system is made of signs, meanings, a code and a codemaker, and as biologists, we know that there is a genetic code to protein synthesis. We also know that proteins, in turn, are made by a system of ribonucleoproteins and that this system is the physical seat of the genetic code and that functions therefore as the ' codemaker' of the cell. Th is tells us that every living cell does have a genetic code and a codemaker. But what about the other two entities? Can we say that there are also signs and meanings at the molecular level? Can such entities exist in the cell? In order to answer this question, let us examine fi rst the traditional signs and meanings of culture to see if they have a qualifying feature that can be extended to the molecular level.
Th e signs and meanings that we are most familiar with are often the mental representations of objects and events in the physical world. A sign, for example, can be a spoken word and its meaning can be a mental image. Th e mental image of an object may be normally evoked by diff erent words in diff erent languages, and this clearly shows that sounds and mental images are separable. When they are separated, however, they no longer function as signs and meanings. To a non-English speaker, for example, a word like 'twitch' may have no linguistic meaning and in this case it would be just a sound, not a sign. Th ere is no contradiction therefore in saying that signs and meaning are distinct mental objects and that they cannot be taken apart, because when they are taken apart they simply stop functioning as signs and meanings.
Th is exemplifi es an extremely important feature of semiosis. It shows us that a mental sign, or a mental meaning, is never an intrinsic property of a mental object. It is something that the mind can give to a mental object and that the mind can take away from it. It is the mind, and more precisely the mental codemaker, that brings signs and meanings into existence.
Mental signs and mental meanings simply do not exist without a code maker, or outside of a codemaking process. Th e codemaker is the agent of semiosis, whereas signs and meanings are its instruments. We conclude therefore that signs and meanings are totally dependent on codemaking, i.e., they are codemaker-dependent entities. Th is is the qualifying feature that we were looking for, because it is completely general and can be applied to all systems. We can therefore establish that signs and meanings exist at the molecular level, and in particular in protein synthesis, only if we prove that in protein synthesis there are such codemaker-dependent entities.
The Sequences of Genes and Proteins
All biochemistry textbooks confi rm that there is a genetic code in protein synthesis, but none of them mentions the existence of signs and meanings. At fi rst sight, in fact, these entities do not seem to exist at the molecular level. Th e genetic translation apparatus can be regarded as a ' codemaker' because it is the seat of the code that creates a correspondence between genes and proteins -but these molecules appear to have only ' objective' chemical properties, and not the ' codemaker-dependent' properties that defi ne signs and meanings. A messenger RNA, for example, appears to be a unique and objective sequence of molecules, but let us take a closer look.
A messenger RNA is certainly a unique and objective chain of nucleotides, but in no way it is a unique sequence of codons, because diff erent codemakers can and do scan it in diff erent ways. If the nucleotides were scanned twoby-two, for example, (or even three-by-three, as usual, but starting from one additional nucleotide to the left or right) the sequence of codons would be totally diff erent; while the objectively observable chain of the nucleotide would remain exactly the same. Th e same chain of nucleotides, in other words, can give origin to many sequences of codons -and it is always the codemaker that determines the sequence, because it is the codemaker that defi nes the codons as codons. A linear sequence of codons, in short, does not exist without a codemaker, nor outside of a codemaking process. It is totally dependent on codemaking and is therefore a codemaker-dependent entity, which is precisely what we have defi ned a sign as.
In the same way, the linear sequence of amino acids that is produced by the translation apparatus is also a codemaker-dependent entity, because only a codemaker can produce it. Just any spontaneous assembly of amino acids would not make linear chains -and, above all, it would not arrange the amino acids to a specifi c order. Specifi c linear sequences of amino acids can be produced only by codemakers -and again, diff erent codemakers would arrange the amino acids in diff erent ways -which shows that the resulting sequence of a protein is only one of the many possible 'meanings' that could be given to an objective string of nucleotides.
Th e sequence of a gene and the sequence of a protein, in conclusion, are not objective properties of those molecules. Th ey are codemaker-dependent properties, both because they do not exist without a codemaking process, and because they would be diff erent if the codemaker had a diff erent structure. Th e sequences of genes and proteins, in short, have precisely the characteristics that defi ne signs and meanings. Th ey are codemaker-dependent entities made of organic molecules and are therefore organic signs and organic meanings. All we need to keep in mind is that signs and meanings are mental entities when the codemaker is the mind, but they are organic entities when the codemaker is an organic system (Barbieri 2003) . We reach in this way the conclusion that every living cell contains all four components of semiosis (signs, meanings, code and codemaker) and is therefore a genuinely semiotic system.
Two Types of Signs
Since antiquity, signs have been divided into two great classes that are traditionally represented by symbols and symptoms. Augustine (a.d. 389) called them signa data and signa naturalia, a distinction that continues to these days under the terms of conventional signs and natural signs (Deely 2006; Favareau 2007) . Th e conventional signs are those where there is no physical relationship between signifi ers and meanings and a connection between them can be established only by arbitrary rules, i.e., by conventions. Words, for example, are signs (because they ' stand for' the named entities) and are conventional signs because they are not determined by the characteristics of the named entities. In the same way, there is no necessary connection between symbols and the entities that they stand for (between a fl ag and a country, for example).
In natural signs, by contrast, a physical link is always present between the signifi er and the signifi ed. Typical examples are the symptoms that doctors use to diagnose illnesses (spots on the skin, a fever, a swollen area, etc.), as well as a variety of cues (smoke as sign of fi re, odours as signs of food, footprints as signs of organisms, etc.). In all these cases, there is a physical relationship between the visible signs and the invisible entities that they point to -and yet the relationship is underdetermined, so much so that it takes a process of learning and an act of interpretation to establish it. Th e diagnosis of an illness from symptoms, for example, is always an interpretative exercise, and even simple associations, such as those between clouds and rain, depend upon the processes of learning and memory.
At the molecular level, we have seen that in protein synthesis, a sequence of nucleotides is used as a sign by a codemaker to produce a sequence of amino acids, according to the rules of the genetic code. In that case, there is no necessary connection between the components of the two molecules, and the sequence of nucleotides is used therefore as a conventional organic sign, i.e., as an organic symbol.
A sequence of nucleotides, however, can also be used by a copymaker to produce a complementary copy of itself, and in that case the relationship between the two sequences is no longer established by a code, but by direct physical interactions between complementary surfaces. Th ese interactions, however, occur between very small regions of the molecules, and that means that the fi rst sequence provides only a limited number of physical determinants for the second. Th e fi rst sequence, in other words, does have a physical relationship with the second, but such relationship is undetermined and represents therefore only a ' cue' , i.e., a natural sign, for the second.
We conclude that the distinction between natural and conventional signs exists also at the molecular level, and represents in fact a divide between two very diff erent types of molecular processes. Sequences of nucleotides are used as natural signs in molecular copying, and as conventional signs in molecular coding. Th e replication of genes, in other words, is based on natural organic signs, whereas the synthesis of proteins is based on conventional organic signs.
The Two Versions of the Code Model in Biosemiotics
The discovery of the genetic code took place between 1961 (Niremberg and Matthaei 1961 Khorana et al. 1966; Niremberg et al. 1966) , and almost immediately inspired a version of biosemiotics that is profoundly diff erent from the Peirce-Sebeok approach. It is a version that can be referred to a code-based biosemiotics -because it assumes that semiosis is defi ned by coding, and not by interpretation. Th e evidence for this is that the rules of the genetic code have been virtually the same in all living systems and in all environments ever since the origin of life, which clearly shows that such rules do not depend on interpretation.
Th e manifesto of the code-based biosemiotics was written by George and Muriel Beadle in 1966 in a single simple sentence: "the deciphering of the genetic code has revealed our possession of a language much older than hieroglyphics, a language as old as life itself, a language that is the most living language of all -even if its letters are invisible and its words are buried in the cells of our bodies" (Beadle and Beadle 1966: 207) .
In 1974, Marcel Florkin coined the term 'biosemiotics' for the study of this molecular language, and proposed, as a theoretical framework, the dualistic model of Saussure. He gave the names biosemes and biosyntagms to the basic units of molecular semiosis, but strongly emphasized that linguistic signs are arbitrary whereas molecular signs are not: "A bioseme carries no 'beteutung' , no 'meaning' , because its signifi er is a molecular structure and its signifi ed is a biological function" (Florkin 1974: 13 ).
Florkin' s conclusion was the logical consequence of the idea that the cell is a duality of genotype and phenotype -a biological computer made of genetic software and protein hardware. Th e crucial point is that a computer contains codes, but is not a ' semiotic' system because its codes come from a codemaker which is outside the system. Th is makes it legitimate to say that the components of the cell do not carry real 'meaning' because the genetic code was assembled by natural selection, i.e., by a codemaker that was outside the cell just as the human mind is outside the computer it designs. Th e Saussure-Florkin model, in short, is a version of the code model where the code comes from an external codemaker, and can therefore be referred to as external code model. Such a theoretical framework regards the cell as a biological computer that is not capable of autonomous semiosis -and this is why the fi rst model of true molecular semiosis was the idea that every cell is a trinity of genotype, phenotype and ribotype, i.e., the idea that the cell contains an internal codemaker (Barbieri 1981 (Barbieri , 1985 (Barbieri , 2003 . Th is latter approach is a version of the code model where the code is assembled by an internal codemaker, and can therefore be referred to as internal code model.
One may point out that even the ribotype could have been assembled by natural selection, and that would bring us back to the conclusion that the ultimate codemaker is always outside living systems. Th is is why a model of true molecular semiosis requires also the idea that coding is not completely accounted for by natural selection -i.e., the idea that natural selection and natural conventions are two distinct mechanisms of evolution (Barbieri 1985 (Barbieri , 2003 .
Th ere are, in conclusion, two very diff erent versions of the code model of semiosis, and the failure to distinguish them has seriously confused the issue in recent debates, because it has led people to identify the code model with the Saussurean model -i.e., with the version where semiosis is produced by an external codemaker, whereas, as I have attempted to make clear here, it is explicitly a model that is dependent upon the existence of an internal codemaker. Th at this internal codemaker is not synonymous with an internal interpreter, is what I wish similarly to make clear next.
On the Peirce Model
Th e most authoritative treatise of semiotics, published in four volumes between 1997 and 2003 by Roland Posner, Klaus Robering and Th omas Sebeok, defi nes semiosis in unmistakably Peircean terms:
We stipulate that the following is a necessary and suffi cient condition for something to be a semiosis: A interprets B as representing C. In this relational characterization of semiosis, A is the Interpretant, B is some object, property, relation, event, or state of aff airs, and C is the meaning that A assigns to B. (Posner et al. 1997: 4) By the 1990s, much of the Peircean approach to biosemiotics had become almost universally accepted, and today too semiotics is still synonymous with Peircean-semiotics, which means that the concept of sign is still squarely based on interpretation. As a result, it has been taken almost for granted that the extension of semiosis to the animal world and to the entire living world, is nothing but the extension of Peircean-semiosis to all of life. Sebeok expressed this concept in no uncertain terms: "Because there can be no semiosis without interpretability -surely life's cardinal propensity -semiosis presupposes the axiomatic identity of the semiosphere with the biosphere" (Sebeok 2001: 68) .
We have seen, however, that the Peircean model cannot be applied to the cell because the genetic code does not depend on interpretation. But is this an insurmountable obstacle? Couldn't we say, for example, that the seat of the genetic code, i.e., the ' codemaker' of the cell, is an 'interpreter'? Why shouldn't we generalize the concept of interpretation and say that an act of coding is also an act of interpretation?
In principle, of course, we could, but there is a caveat. If we generalize the concept of interpretation in order to include coding, why don't we go the whole way and generalize it even further? Why don't we say, following Edwina Taborsky, that any function
is an act of interpretation whereby the function 'f' interprets 'x' as representing 'y'? (Taborsky 1999: 601) . In this way all physical laws expressed by functions like f would be processes of interpretation and therefore acts of semiosis.
Th e point is that Peirce himself took this view and concluded that semiosis exists everywhere in the universe. We realize in this way that if we generalize the concept of interpretation, thusly, the Peircean model would become a 'pansemiotic' model, not a biosemiotic one. If we want to keep the biosemiotic idea that semiosis started with life, therefore, we must also keep the traditional concept of interpretation, and in this case we can no longer apply the Peircean model to the cell. Th is does not mean that the Peirce model is wrong. It means that it is valid only for those living systems that are capable of interpretation in the traditional sense of the word, i.e., for organisms that have a nervous system. It also mean that we need a defi nition of semiosis that does not depend on interpretation, and luckily we can easily obtain it by generalizing the defi nition proposed by Posner, Robering and Sebeok (1997: 4) reported earlier. Our modifi ed formulation thus becomes:
We stipulate that the following is a necessary and suffi cient condition for something to be a semiosis: A establishes a conventional correspondence between B and C. In this relational characterization of semiosis, A is the Adaptor, B is some object, property, relation, event, or state of aff airs that is taken as a sign and C is the meaning that A assigns to B.
The Evolution of Semiosis
Th e genetic code was the fi rst code in the history of life and the apparatus of protein synthesis was the fi rst semiotic system that appeared on Earth. But what happened afterwards? Th e evidence suggests that many other organic codes came into being, particularly in eukaryotic cells, and accounted for many great biological innovations that appeared in those cells in the fi rst three billion years of evolution (Barbieri 1985 (Barbieri , 2003 .
Th e complexity of the genome, however, could not increase indefi nitely and there was a limit to the number of codes that could be programmed in the genes. Th is is particularly evident in the case of animal behaviour. Th e most primitive behaviors were almost entirely determined by genes, but the number of hardwired responses could not grow indefi nitely, and animals started resorting to processes of learning in order to increase their behavioral repertoire.
Learning how to respond to a signal, on the other hand, means learning how to interpret that signal, and this amounts to the construction of a behavioral code whose rules are context-dependent. At the same time, learning requires a memory where the results of experience are accumulated, and this means that interpretation is also a memory-dependent process. A process of interpretation, in short, is a new type of semiosis because it is dependent on learning, memory and context.
Systems capable of interpretation, in turn, evolved in many diff erent ways and eventually a third type of semiosis appeared -a semiosis that was based on symbolic codes shared by all members of a community, i.e., on language. Th e evolution of semiosis is characterized therefore by three great innovations: (1) the origin of organic semiosis (the semiotic threshold), (2) the origin of interpretation (the hermeneutic threshold), and (3) the origin of language (the symbolic threshold).
Th e origin of semiosis and the origin of interpretation were separated by almost three billion years of cellular evolution, because interpretation is dependent on learning, memory and context, and probably evolved only in multicellular systems. Th e origin of language came after another fi ve hundred million years and apparently evolved only in our species. Th e history of semiosis, in conclusion, was a process that started with context-free codes and produced codes that were more and more context-dependent. Today, our cultural codes are so heavily dependent on context that we can hardly imagine semiosis without interpretation, and yet these are distinct processes and we need to keep them apart if we want to understand their origin and their evolution in the history of life.
Toward a Scientific Biosemiotics
Biosemiotics can become a science only if we can prove that the cell -the necessary and suffi cient unit of all life -is a semiotic system. But in order to achieve this goal, we cannot rely on the models of Saussure and Peirce, because they are not applicable to the molecular level. We need a third model of semiosis, and luckily such a model does exist.
It has been suggested that the Peircean model can be extended to the cell simply by generalizing the concept of interpretation, but this is not a satisfactory solution because the issue is not about words, it is about real processes and real objects. We need three distinct types of semiosis because there are three distinct types of objects in life: there are organic objects, mental objects and cultural objects. Th e origin and the evolution of life was the origin and the evolution of the diff erent entities that make up the three worlds of life: the organic world, the mental world and the world of culture.
In order to prove that the cell is a semiotic system, in short, we need a model of organic semiosis, not a model of mental semiosis extended to the organic world. But that is not all. We also need to realize that the cell is not a duality of genotype and phenotype, but a trinity of genotype, phenotype and ribotype, because a semiotic system is necessarily made of three distinct categories, one of which is a codemaker and the other two of which are signs (genotypes) and their meanings (phenotypes) (Barbieri 1981) . Finally, we need to realize that evolution took place not only by natural selection, but also by natural conventions because all types of semiosis are based on conventions (Barbieri 1985 (Barbieri , 2003 .
Th us, in order to build a scientifi c biosemiotics, we need new concepts both in semiotics and in biology. More precisely, we need a new model of semiosis, a new theory of the cell and a new mechanism of evolution. All these ideas have already been proposed, and we can therefore start building a scientifi c biosemiotics on the basis of the following foundational concepts:
(1) Semiosis is defi ned by coding, not by interpretation (2) Th e agents of semiosis are the codemakers, not the signs (3) Signs and meanings are codemaker-dependent entities (4) Genetic sequences are codemaker-dependent entities and are the organic signs of protein synthesis (5) Protein sequences are codemaker-dependent entities and are the organic meanings of protein synthesis (6) Th e translation apparatus is a semiotic system made of organic signs, organic meanings and the genetic code (7) Th e cell is a semiotic system made of genes, proteins and codemaker (genotype, phenotype and ribotype) (8) Th e basic mechanisms of life are copying and coding (9) Th e basic mechanisms of evolution are natural selection (from copying) and natural conventions (from coding).
We conclude that a scientifi c biosemiotics is possible, but only if we go beyond the models of Saussure and Peirce. Th ese models are still valid, but only in the worlds of cultural semiosis and mental semiosis. Now we need a model also for the greater world of organic semiosis. Th is is not a denial of Saussure and Peirce. On the contrary, it is the real continuation of their work, for it is the step that allows us to prove that semiosis is fundamental to the whole of life and that the cell is a true semiotic system.
